HITLER'S PATH TO WAR, 1937-1939

I. HITLER'S STRATEGY

   A. CLEAR OBJECTIVES, FLEXIBLE TIMETABLE

   B. THE HOSSBACH MEMORANDUM, 5 NOV 37

   C. STRUGGLE GIVES LIFE MEANING

   D. BLITZKRIEG WARFARE: NO ATTRITION

   E. NO TWO-FRONT WAR

II. APPEASEMENT

   A. ECONOMIC: BRING GERMANY IN

   B. POLITICAL: MAKE REASONABLE DEALS

   C. MILITARY: EXERCISE CAUTION

   D. WEAKNESS: NO AVOIDANCE OF WAR

        WITHOUT HITLER'S REMOVAL

III. AUSTRIAN ANSCHLUSS, FEB-MAR 1938

   A. KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG

        1. MEETING OF 12 FEB

        2. PLEBISCITE ANNOUNCEMENT, 9 MAR

   B. SPONTANEOUS INVASION, 11-12 MAR

        1. MUSSOLINI'S SUPPORT

        2. HITLER IN VIENNA

IV. CZECH CRISIS, MAY 1938 - MARCH 1939

   A. 22 MAR 38: BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

   B. THE SUDETEN QUESTION

        1. SELF-DETERMINATION

        2. GENUINE GRIEVANCES

        3. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

   C. COMMITMENTS

        1. FRANCE: THE LITTLE ENTENTE

        2. ENGLAND: AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING

   D. CHAMBERLAIN MEETS HITLER

        1. BERCHTESGADEN, 15 SEP

        2. BAD GODESBERG, 22 SEP

        3. MUNICH, 29-30 SEP

   E. THE KEY ISSUE: GERMANY'S RESOLVE

        TO DOMINATE EUROPE BY FORCE

   F. THE TURNING POINT, 15 MARCH 1939

V. THE DANZIG CRISIS, APR-SEP 1939

   A. THE ANGLO-FRENCH GUARANTEE, 31 MAR

   B. BECK'S ASSESSMENT

   C. STALIN'S ANALYSIS

        1. NATURE OF APPEASEMENT: ANTI-SOVIET

        2. EFFECT OF THE PURGES

        3. MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT, 23 AUG

   D. INVASION, 1 SEP

        1. CHAMBERLAIN BEFORE THE HOUSE

        2. AMERY: "SPEAK FOR ENGLAND!"

        3. THE ANGLO-FRENCH ULTIMATUM

        4. HITLER TO GOERING: "WHAT NOW?"