2007/08/26 23:05 Filed in:
Biopsychology Theoretical
Over the many years that psychologists have studied optical illusions, they have encountered a bewildering variety of strange experiences in the consciousness of their subjects. People saw things that weren't there or experienced the sensation of motion when none existed or found their perceptual set rapidly changing from one configuration to another. These decades of research and the findings of neuropsychologists about the make-up of the central nervous system led psychologists to propose something our "common sense" has difficulty understanding, namely, that our perception of the world is a very, very elaborate construction in which the nervous system builds a sophisticated experience of the world from multiple sources of sensory data. Optical or visual illusions, then, seem to uncover the seamlessness of that construction, to reveal to us how the brain has to weigh or evaluate what it receives from the senses in order to fabricate a meaningful and unified experience of the world and the self within that world. (In the Hermann Grid illusion on the right, we tend to see dark spots at the intersection of vertical and horizontal white lines, an perceptual artifact arising within the nervous system itself.)
In research that was just reported in latest issue of the journal, Science, two different teams of researchers at European universities have manipulated the visual and tactile sensory systems of study participants to induce the illusion that these persons were "out of their bodies". As Sandra Blakeslee reports in the New York Times (August 24, 2007):
Using virtual-reality goggles, a camera and a stick, scientists have induced out-of-body experiences — the sensation of drifting outside of one’s own body — in ordinary, healthy people, according to studies being published today in the journal Science. When people gazed at an illusory image of themselves through the goggles and were prodded in just the right way with the stick, they felt as if they had left their bodies. The research reveals that “the sense of having a body, of being in a bodily self,” is actually constructed from multiple sensory streams, said one expert on body and mind, Dr. Matthew M. Botvinick, an assistant professor of neuroscience at Princeton University. Usually these sensory streams, which include vision, touch, balance and the sense of where one’s body is positioned in space, work together seamlessly, Dr. Botvinick said. But when the information coming from the sensory sources does not match up, the sense of being embodied as a whole comes apart. The brain, which abhors ambiguity, then forces a decision that can, as the new experiments show, involve the sense of being in a different body.
The longer of the two studies (Lennenhager et al., 2007) offers this abstracted description of their findings:
Humans normally experience the conscious self as localized within their bodily borders. This spatial unity may break down in certain neurological conditions such as out-of-body experiences, leading to a striking disturbance of bodily self-consciousness. On the basis of these clinical data, we designed an experiment that uses conflicting visual-somatosensory input in virtual reality to disrupt the spatial unity between the self and the body. We found that during multisensory conflict, participants felt as if a virtual body seen in front of them was their own body and mislocalized themselves toward the virtual body, to a position outside their bodily borders. Our results indicate that spatial unity and bodily self-consciousness can be studied experimentally and are based on multisensory and cognitive processing of bodily information.
These results raise provocative questions about what it means to be a "self" and may actually move clinical researchers more deeply into an examination of neuroperceptual mechanisms in disorders such as schizophrenia. At the recent APA meeting in San Francisco, I heard a fascinating (and very difficult) paper by Louis Sass, Ph.D. of Rutgers (NJ) who presented a phenomenological model of schizophrenia, one which is rooted in defective processing of perceptual experience by the individual.
Target Articles: (A) Ehrsson, H. H. (2007, August 24). The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences. Science, 317(5841), 1048. (B) Lenggenhager, B., Tadi, T., Metzinger, T, & Blanke, O. (2007, August 24). Video ergo sum: Manipulating bodily self-consciousness. Science, 317(5841), 1096-1099.
Newspaper Report: Blakeslee, S. (2007, August 24). Studies report inducing out-of-body experience. New York Times (Online).
Other Citations: Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2001). Phenomenology of self-disturbances in schizophrenia: Some research findings and directions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 8(4), 347-356. [LMC Access]
Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2003). Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29(3), 427-444. [Abstract] 2007/08/17 20:55 Filed in:
General Psychology Law SocialWell, the annual APA convention has gotten underway in San Francisco at its usual venue downtown, the Moscone Center South (and West) plus some of the local hotels. I've been out in this area of California since almost the beginning of the month and, for the last week, have been visiting friends in the City. It has been an extraordinary August, so far: the fog has been minimal or absent in the mornings and the rest of the days have been sunny and warm. A rebuke to the supposed remark of Mark Twain ("the coldest winter I ever saw was the summer I spent in San Francisco") which he may or may not have said.
The pressing issue of this convention turns out to be the question of the torture of prisoners by the United States government's forces in places like Guantanamo Bay, the involvement of psychologists in developing or advising about interrogation techniques which are torturous, and the ethical lapses or failures of both these psychologists and the American Psychological Association itself in rejecting such activities. My first session this morning involved a symposium/discussion on the topic: "Ethics and Interrogations-Confronting the Challenge: What Does the Research on 
Interrogations Tell Us?" The room for this session was both filled with listeners and a host of people from the media who are here to cover the conference's various sessions on this topic. Indeed, I don't think in the 20+ years I have been attending APA meetings I have ever seen as many reporters and writers as I did today. Mark Costanzo (Claremont-McKenna) led off by describing what we know about coersive interrogation techniques and false confessions in the forensic/criminal justice world. He demonstrated the frequent occurrence of false confessions and the inability of the interrogators to identify when suspects are lying or not. Charles Morgan (Yale Medical School) offered a defense of many techniques and quibbled with notions like "do no harm" or objections to coersion, deception, and other similar issues which, he claimed, physicians routinely carry out in order to help their patients. He was later attacked by an questionner from the audience as a apologist for the government. Shara Sand (Yeshiva) read through the report of the Office of the Inspector General of the Defense Department about the SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistence, and Escape) program and its supposedly sole use as a defensive, rather than offensive instrument by the American military. She detailed the connection between recent work on programs like SERE and early work (in the 1950s) on brainwashing and mind control by the CIA and DOD under the help and direction of psychologists and other behavioral specialists, the so-called MKULTRA program. Finally, Phil Zimbardo (Stanford) gave an incredibly lively and empassioned talk on the history of interrogation research (including his own very early, but ignored work in the 1950s) and made a sharp distinction between the positive findings of social psychology on how to foster rapport and a willingness to confess by suspects and the uniformly negative findings about interrogations employing coersive and abusive techniques. These, he stressed, regularly result in poor information and are often utterly a waste of time. The moderator/chair of the symposium, Bradley Olson (Northwestern), offered somewhat extended comments after each speaker despite his disclaimer that he would not be an "activist chair" (though he was). And while I agreed with many of his points, the structure of these off-the-cuff comments tended to wander and seemed to be out of place.
Later in the day, there was a demonstration in the Yerba Buena Gardens across from Moscone South by Psychologists for an Ethical APA. The crowd it attracted seemed to me to consist of about 200-300 pretty committed and enthusiastic. On Sunday morning, the APA Council of Representatives is going to take up a resolution which moves toward (but not quite endorse) the notion that there should be a moratorium by psychologists cooperating with the government in detainee interrogations (see these documents on this matter submitted to APA). The rest of the convention is going to have programming detailing different aspects of this topic (Ethics and Interrogation) through to Monday afternoon. It will be intriguing to see what the final outcome is going to be. Stay tuned.